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Abstract 
 This article questions the supreme role of the Ethiopian National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in the prevention and countering of 
alleged terrorist acts vis-à-vis its institutional legitimacy and operational 
integrity. With no exception to other states, Ethiopia also re-established the 
National Intelligence and Security Service in 2013 but as a sole and unique 
institution of its kind with multiplex mandates both on general and specific 
intelligence and security matters. Having in mind the more sensitive powers 
conferred to the institution and its unrivalled authority in masterminding all the 
preventive and punitive measures against alleged terrorist conducts as 
enshrined under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of the country, this article 
examines whether the establishing proclamation has set the required normative 
standards and watchdogging institutional platforms to ensure its functional 
accountability. After investigating the Service’s organizational structure, the 
public, judicial and political watchdogging apparatuses, the lack of 
administrative and financial transparency, as well as the alleged alliance of the 
institution to the regime in power, this article submits that the Ethiopian 
National Intelligence and Security Service lacks the key attributes of a 
politically independent and functionally autonomous institution that strives to 
protect the nation’s politico-economic and security interests. As it stands, 
much of the Services’s mission rather appears to have been constricted to 
serving as an untouchable guardian of the party or the regime in power, or as 
a rising unique entity that roams on its own impervious orbit.             
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“Intelligence report prepared in relation to terrorism, even if the report 
does [not] disclose the source or the method it was gathered shall be admissible 
by the court.” (FDRE Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009, Art. 23(1)).  
 
1. Introduction 
Needless to say – particularly at this time when the world is confronting 
the threat of terrorism as one of the gravest trepidations to the international 
peace and security – only few would contest the irreplaceable role that national 
intelligence and security service agencies could play in making state’s action 
for the prevention and countering the crime a success (Hughbank & Githens, 
2010). As a preliminary note, infiltrating deep into all the multi-disciplinary 
views based in philosophical, political, military and/or security discourses on 
matters relating to intelligence and security organs of any government is 
beyond the reach of this article. It is rather restricted more into the minimum 
legal tin-tacks that the law is normally expected to regulate, and if not, the 
malfunction of which would cause some unjustified or at least unintended grim 
to the entire system.  
With this scope in mind, an attempt is made to pinpoint some of the very 
grand issues relating to the overtly extended but unfettered powers of the 
Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service in light of its role in the 
prevention and combating terrorism. In so doing, the organisational 
accountability and oversight or supervision mechanisms, budgeting and issues 
of transparency, and more specifically, the actual and potential use of 
intelligence information in the overall national counter-terrorism normative 
settings, as well as its impact on the daily functioning of the ordinary law 
enforcement in the criminal justice system are roughly inquired.  
2.  Re-establishment of the National Intelligence and Security 
Service: A Rogue Elephant?  
It goes without saying that ‘Intelligence and Security Services’ – no matter 
how shadowy – are one of the very crucial aspects in the success or otherwise 
story of any government in all its political, economic, diplomatic, security and 
overall national interest affairs – be it democratic, authoritarian or any other 
form or system of government (Omand, 2010; Johnson, 2010; Svendsen, 
2012). With no exception to its counterparts, Ethiopia has also been 
accustomed to the system mainly after the establishment of the National 
Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority back in 1995 (FDRE, 
Proclamation No. 6/1995). With no need to look back into the former 
intelligence and security frameworks, the current institutional setup, i.e.; the 
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) was re-established pursuant 
to Proclamation No. 804/2013 (Art. 4). 
A sift probe to some of the provisions of this proclamation may definitely 
be a stirring factor to raise multiple questions. For one thing, it is only this 
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institution that the Proclamation entrusted as a sole operator of all matters of 
intelligence and security – including that of international intelligence 
cooperation (Ibid, Arts. 7-9). Neither a regional nor other federal intelligence 
and/or security services can be established (Ibid, Art. 4(3)). Even within the 
NISS intra-institutional setup, there is no explicitly mounted organisational 
subdivision with a separate functional autonomy that takes into account the 
various purposes and goals of intelligence and security. In fact, article 11 of 
the Proclamation appears to indicate the internal organogram and structure of 
the institution by dictating the Service to have a Director General appointed by 
the Prime Minister, Intelligence Organs, Security Organs, Support Organs, and 
the necessary staff. However, none of the powers and duties of each 
department are explicitly defined. Nor is their horizontal and functional 
autonomy explicitly stated and regulated so that it is only the NISS as a single 
entity established and recognized by the Proclamation in its legal personality.  
In some other national jurisdictions, there are independent and specific 
task-oriented intelligence and security agencies. At the federal level alone, 
Germany has, for example, four distinct and functionally autonomous 
intelligence and security departments: the Federal Intelligence and Security 
service (Bundesamt für den Verfassungsschutz)[BfV]; the Federal Foreign 
Intelligence and Security Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) [BND]; the 
Federal Criminal Intelligence and Security Service 
(Bundeskriminalamt) [BKA]; and the Federal Military Intelligence and 
Security Service (Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst) [MAD] (FAS, 
Pike & Aftergood, 2018). They are explicitly established and recognised by 
law with their own independent legal personality and maintaining visible 
demarcation of their respective missions - besides the general policy-based 
cohesion and collaboration expected among the divisions, given the reality that 
it is the national interest, which all are understandably pursuing to ensure 
(Heyer, 2007; Wetzling, 2016; Wetzling 2017).  
Also in the United Kingdom, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); 
Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ), and the UK Security 
Service (MI5) are the three main agencies mandated to carry out the national 
intelligence and security matters within their own distinctive veins under the 
supervisory oversight role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
(Morrison, 2007; FAS, 2018). Alongside, additional four intelligence agencies 
– the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), the National Security Secretariat 
(NSS), the Defence Intelligence (DI), and the Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism (OSCT) – are also operating to carry out specifically assigned 
security and intelligence missions (ISC Annual Report, 2017).  Likewise, in 
the US, out of the reportedly seventeen functionally active intelligence and 
security agencies,  the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are the two principal institutional platforms that 
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are undertaking the intelligence and security activities in light of their own 
respective missions and objectives (Johnson, 2007; FAS, 2018; ODNI, n. d.). 
In Bulgaria, almost in a similar fashion, divisions containing: The Foreign 
Intelligence; the Domestic Counter-Intelligence, the Military Counter-
Intelligence, the Technical Intelligence, and the VIP Protection and Political 
Counter-Intelligence are established with their own prioritised mandates and 
missions (Born & Capparin, 2007).  
Back to the continent of Africa, in South Africa, for instance, the National 
Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), South African Secret Service 
(SASS]), National Defence Force Intelligence Division, National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA), and South African Police Service (SAPS) are the five main 
divisions that possess their own exclusive intelligence and security powers and 
duties (Ford, 1997; Nathan, 2010); Dietrich, 2016; FAS, 2018). 
What can be grasped from these varied national experiences is the reality 
that there is no uniformity among states in their institutional structural 
approach while setting the intelligence and security sector. Indeed, there 
should not be a necessity for sameness as there is nothing more 'national' than 
the issue of 'national intelligence and security' itself (Scheppele, 2010, p.437). 
Accordingly, expecting similarity would be an ignominy to the reality. This 
said, however, a more thoughtful observation of the models adopted in the 
aforementioned states would indicate some aspects common to all, and the 
rationales behind thereof. In most States, at least three or more institutions are 
established with mandates to handle such a sensitive task but in a separate, 
autonomous, well-defined and varied objectives. The raison d'être behind all 
these arrangements seems apparently clear. For one thing, 'intelligence' in itself 
as a secret information obtained in secret" (Morrison, 2007, p. 42), it is not a 
'single-purposive' ingredient in any decision making. Some intelligence 
information is used for military policies, decisions, and strategies while others 
are referenced for diplomatic and foreign relations. Still, other intelligence 
feedbacks are collected to analyse the internal security whereas a range of other 
clandestine information is often deployed as inputs to justify the overall 
economic, political and technological policy directions (Johnson, 2010). 
But not all these bunch of intelligence information have, or even need the 
same level or degree of secrecy, credibility, acceptance, and consumable status 
(Selth, 2009; Giupponi & Fabbrini, 2010; Rebugio, 2013; Gainor & 
Bouthillier, 2014). Accordingly, the more non-compacted and systematically 
clustered intelligence and security institutions are organised in a State – 
assuming full ownership and responsibility with particular reference to each of 
the traditionally known purposes of intelligence information as narrated above 
– the highly it becomes pursuable to maintain accountable, legitimate, public 
interest-oriented, flexible and purpose-based management of the entire 
intelligence and security operation of the state. To the contrary, leaving such a 
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complex intelligence and security mission simply with a mingled arbitrarily 
listing of a range of powers and authorities to a single institution might trigger 
the gradual creation of an uncontrolled intelligence and security agency as a 
sole and vicious animal that roams alone; that is a rogue Elephant. 
 That was what Germany experienced during the Nazi regime that had led 
to the creation of the 'Gestapo' state secret police (GeheimeStaatPolizei), which 
was known for its notorious brutality. Establishing the current special unit of 
the Federal Police, i.e., the Federal Criminal Intelligence and Security Service 
[Bundeskriminalamt] (BKA) is, therefore, largely regarded as an institutional 
readjustment which aims rectifying such a historical discontent by curbing 
some unsolicited fusions with that of the works of the general intelligence 
service (FAS, 2018). 
In light of the existing legislative and practical quirks, it would be 
nonsensical to neglect the risk for the emergence of a similar 'Gestapo' in the 
Ethiopian context. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) –  as 
an exclusive and sui generis organ of its kind – is endowed with all unbridled 
powers and duties in arbitrarily listed twenty-seven major activities under three 
major categories of general powers and duties, Intelligence powers and duties, 
and security powers and duties. 
 
3. Powers and Duties: Merging Irreconcilable Operations? 
As stipulated under articles 7 to 9 of the Proclamation, the NISS’s 
principal mandates range from that of the power to follow up and investigate 
any internal and external activity intended to overthrow the constitution and 
constitutional order to that of heading and coordinating national 
counterterrorism cooperation and represent the country in international and 
continental counter-terrorism relation, and cooperation as a leading 
representative (NISS Re-Establishment Proclamation No.804(2013), Art. 8 (1 
& 2)). The NISS is also entrusted with the power to investigate terrorism and 
extremism and collect intelligence and evidence. It also carries out the task of 
following up and investigate espionage activity against the interest of the 
country and its people and collect information and undertake counter-
espionage activity (Ibid, Art. 8(3 & 5)). Alongside, NISS is also empowered 
to pursue and collect intelligence and evidence on other serious crimes which 
are threats to the national interest and security and can conduct surveillance on 
any person suspected of having committed any of the aforementioned criminal 
activities (Ibid, Art. 8(6 & 7)). By the same token, the task of preparing and 
submitting to the government, of criteria for the classification and level of 
protection of confidential information and follow up its implementation upon 
approval remains its mandate.  Besides, the NISS also assumes the duty of 
providing security to the heads of the state and the government as well as 
critical institutions (Ibid, Art. 9(5, 8 & 12)). It is also the duty of the NISS to 
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lead the national aviation security (Ibid, Art. 9(3)). Other missions such as 
detecting threats to the national economy and development; serious problems 
of good governance and conspiracies; providing nationality and immigration 
service to Ethiopians alongside monitoring services to refugees; licensing and 
issuing security clearance for private security organisations; and overseeing 
the issuance of the national identity card are also singlehandedly undertaken 
by this institution (Ibid, Art. 8 (1, 4) and Art. 9 (1, 2, 4,5,6 and 11).  
4. Specific Powers of the NISS in the Prevention and Countering of 
Terrorism  
With regard to the specific institutional deficits of the NISS associated to 
its unalloyed powers in the prevention and countering of terrorism, one has to 
methodically analyse the various authorising provisions of the anti-terrorism 
proclamation. Accordingly, for a heuristic purpose, the towering clouts of the 
NISS can be summarised and displayed from three overarching functions 
entrusted to this institution.   
Firstly, article 30 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation bestows the 
leadership role in the operation of the National Anti-Terrorism Coordinating 
Committee to the NISS. The Committee – which is in charge of preventing and 
controlling terrorist acts by drawing up a counter-terrorism plan with a joint 
task force – is composed of the NISS, the Ministry of Justice (replace by the 
recently established Office of Attorney General), and the Federal Police 
Commission represented by their respective heads. Needless to say, this 
compositional setting depicts nothing but the hierarchical supremacy of the 
NISS over the other two ecumenically acknowledged law enforcement organs 
of the state that are left merely as subordinate bodies for the task of preventing 
and countering terrorism in the country. Such an intelligence and security-
based approach to a perceived or actual threat of terrorism have put in limbo, 
of the very demanding duty of the state to scrutinize and normatively harness 
the proper functioning of the NISS. At the same time, such a virtual portrayal 
of the ordinary law enforcement organs as subservient bodies to intelligence 
and security service also egregiously undermines the already deteriorated 
values of rule of law and the various due process rights to have no place in the 
daily operations undertaken under the guise of the prevention and countering 
of terrorism.  
Secondly, as an institution in charge of leading the operational task of 
averting terrorist acts, article 14 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation empowers 
the NISS to intercept and conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, 
internet, electronic, postal, and other similar communications of a person 
suspected of terrorism, and this includes the power to enter into any premise 
in secret to install and enforce the interception (Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 
Art. 14(1)). To this end, every communication service provider is duty-bound 
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to cooperate when requested to do so by the NISS. This same provision also 
requires the information gathered through such a method to be kept in secret 
(Ibid, Art. 14(2)). Even if securing a court warrant is stipulated as a requisite 
in order for the NISS to exercise these powers, a careful reading of article 23 
of the Proclamation would denote that the requirement of a court warrant is 
virtually inconsequential (see the discussion infra). 
The third fundamental authority of the NISS emanates from its role and 
direct involvement in dictating the ordinary criminal litigations on cases 
relating to terrorism. This is mainly because of the emphatically 
unchallengeable trust commended to it by recognizing its intelligence reports, 
ipso facto, admissible in court proceedings. As clearly provided under article 
23 (1) of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, even if the NISS does not disclose 
the source or the method used to gather the information, intelligence report 
prepared in relation to terrorism is deemed valid and admissible in court. 
The key but comprehensibly unreciprocated question is, therefore, how 
logical and legitimate would it be to statutorily declare the admissibility of the 
information obtained by such an inundated, effusive and overwhelmed organ 
which is fully packed with multi-purposive tasks that may or may not require 
secrecy?  Above all, the Proclamation’s firm stand in blocking any chance of 
judicially probing the validity of the source and the methods deployed to 
extract the information exacerbates the risk of abusing the Institution’s 
mandate while dealing with politically motivated cases frequently instituted 
against individuals targeted as threats to the regime in power rather than the 
public and the nation at large.    
For that matter, the issue of whether intelligence and security sources have 
to be credible evidence in ordinary criminal litigation is highly debatable 
(Voorhout, 2005; Vervaele, 2005; Forcese & Waldman, 2007; Born et al, 
2011). Obviously, it is irrefutable that – given the present-day complexity of 
the threat of terrorism – the work of gathering intelligence and prosecuting 
alleged perpetrators of the crime are becoming the two sides of a coin both in 
the preventive and retributive aspects of countering terrorism. Accordingly, 
cooperation and information-sharing between intelligence and security 
services and law enforcement institutions could be both strategically and 
practically effective (Završnik, 2013).  
This said, however, as soundly submitted by Eijkman & Ginkel (2011), 
such a concurrent approach has to be compatible with fundamental rights and 
basic principles of rule of law and the right to fair trial. The later is a principle 
that demands ensuring the right of everyone – including terror suspects – to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty, and their right to be tried publicly 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial judiciary (Ibid, p. 4). 
Moreover, even in states where such cooperation between the intelligence and 
security institutions and law enforcement organs is persistently increasing, 
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those evidences emerging from the intelligence are usually used only for the 
purpose of alarming the police so that the later may initiate investigation, 
instead of directly forwarding those intelligence sources as end products to 
serve as valid evidence in court without any judicial scrutiny and 
authentication (Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights, 2009). 
Accordingly, if such an institutional nexus is to enhance the realistically 
and synergically expected outcome in the prevention and countering of 
terrorism, there needs to have a strict normative and procedural standard that 
should properly govern the admissibility status and the manner of 
(un)disclosing information, but without diluting the undeniable right of the 
accused to refute such information, not only substantially but also by 
challenging the source and the modus the evidence was procured.  
This requisite emanates from the very grand purposive difference between 
the work of intelligence and that of the ordinary law enforcement organs. That 
is, intelligence and security agencies are tasked with a mission of collecting 
information for the purpose of national security whereby – for all the possible 
reasons – ‘keeping confidential of all the sources’ becomes the governing rule. 
The law enforcement agencies (police and public prosecutor), on the other 
gather evidence for criminal investigations in which case, a ''fair trial principle'' 
serves as a guiding rule that allows both the prosecutor and defence counsel or 
the suspect to enjoy equal access to the evidence (Eijkman & Ginkel, 2011, pp. 
5-6). 
Looking at the Ethiopian approach as adopted in the two proclamations – 
the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Art. 23) and the National 
Intelligence and Security Service Re-establishment Proclamation (Arts. 4, 7-
9) – its indefensible consequential pitfalls can be summarised in threefold: 
First, there is a sui generis intelligence and security organ (NISS) entrusted to 
undertake several but mingled and effusive intelligence and security powers 
and duties. Secondly, its intelligence information are intrinsically recognised 
as admissible evidence in ordinary criminal litigations involving terror 
suspects; and such admissibility is to be reckoned irrespective of the secrecy 
as to the source from where and the means how the information was extracted 
– leaving unguarded the accused's absolute and non-derogable protection from 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Moreover, such a blurring role of the 
NISS is diminishing the unwavering right to fair trial and the constitutional 
guarantee of presumption of innocence of the suspect, which at the end, 
facilitates arbitrariness in depriving the suspect’s liberty on long-term sentence 
after conviction relying on these evidence.  
The judiciary and the ordinary criminal law enforcement organs are not 
the only institutional settings of the state that are suffering from the NISS’s 
extended hand influence in their decision making. In this regard, article 25 of 
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the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation has also exposed the decision-making 
authority of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) – which is the 
supreme legislative and political organ of the state – to remain under the 
shadow of the NISS. This is mainly because, even if the HPR holds the final 
power to proscribe a certain entity or group as a terrorist organization, its 
decision exclusively relies on the information to be submitted by the NISS as 
the only intelligence wing of the government in power. This one-sided-source 
oriented approach makes the decision of the Parliament problematic. On top of 
such an immutable pitfall is the absence of any intra-reviewing mechanism or 
other external platforms to challenge the decision either through a proper 
judicial review or at least through a quasi-administrative appeal options. 
Accordingly, the sketchy and forceful hands of the National Intelligence and 
Security Service in dictating decisions on proscription of entities as a terrorist 
organisation also needs a special attention.  
In view of all the afore-highlighted sensitive powers and functions of the 
NISS, it would only be logical if one expects normatively tightened and 
institutionally robust mechanisms of monitoring and controlling its activities. 
In the section underneath, an attempt is made to examine whether such 
indispensable oversight platforms are put in place to ensure the institution's 
accountability and independence in its daily functioning.     
  
5. Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms 
The other trepidation relates to the capricious oversight mechanisms 
incorporated in the NISS establishment proclamation. Ensuring the political 
independence and accountability in the work of the National Intelligence and 
Security Service demands estimable tools of oversight (Wetzling, 2016; 
Parliament of Australia, 2017). In this regard, there are critical issues that need 
to be analytically confronted.  
As a point of departure, the National Intelligence and Security Service is 
established having a 'Ministerial Status' (NISS Re-Establishment Proclamation 
No. 804/2013, Art. 4(1)) like that of, for example, the National Revenue and 
Customs Authority (Customs Proclamation No. 859/2014). This implies its 
equal status with other ministerial offices of the federal government in terms 
of channels of hierarchical accountability to the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives as the highest legislative and political body of the country.  
Having this in mind, the FDRE Constitution (Proclamation No. 1/1995) 
under articles 55 (13) and 74 (2) requires parliamentary approval of nominees 
for ministerial positions and other top officials by the House of Peoples' 
Representatives. As a result, the authority of the Prime Minister is limited only 
to propose qualified nominees for the positions, and to request the House for 
final endorsement (Ibid, Art. 55(13) & Art. 74(2)). More contiguously, the 
House is unconditionally authorised under article 55 (7) of the Constitution to 
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determine the organisational structures of the National Defence, Public 
Security and the National Police, and to investigate and take necessary 
measures in case when the conduct of any of these organs infringes upon 
human rights and the Nation's Security (Ibid, Art. 55(7)). Accordingly, this 
constitutional mandate is supposed to have an indispensable value in any 
argument demanding for a conceivable oversight of the National Intelligence 
and Security Service beyond the more preferred executive-centered 
supervision mechanism as stipulated in the Proclamation.  
The multifarious deviations in approach from the aforementioned 
constitutional expectations could be extracted from the various provisions of 
the Proclamation that govern matters of accountability and supervision or 
oversight. To begin with, unlike the other Ministerial Heads (Ministers), the 
Director-General – as Chief Executive officer of the Service (NISS) – is 
directly appointed by the Prime Minister with no need to submit the nominee 
to the Parliament for a final endorsement (NISS Re-Establishment 
Proclamation, Art. 11(1)). Then again, the NISS as an institution is accountable 
to the Prime Minister (Ibid, Art. 12(1)), and hence the same person monitors 
and supervises the activities of the Service in the course of exercising his power 
of executive oversight (Ibid, Art. 23) 
Likewise, reports regarding the activities of the Service have to be 
submitted to the same person - the Prime Minister (Ibid, Art. 12(2(g)). 
Moreover, this same Head of the Executive has the authority of approving 
NISS’s institutional budget (Ibid). Under these circumstances, it is plainly 
observable that the Prime Minister is everywhere in the works of the 
institution, from the very initial stages of appointment and budget-related 
powers to those of monitoring and superintending the overall functioning of 
the organisation.  
At the outset, two arguments in descent to this conclusion might be 
inferred from articles 22 and 24 of the Proclamation as these provisions seem 
to recognise non-executive oversight mechanisms by incorporating the 
legislative and judicial supervision platforms respectively. Alas, a careful 
reading of these provisions in conjunction with the other components of the 
proclamation, however, would compel one to be sceptical of their efficacy as 
asserted as follows.  
To begin with, the judicial oversight as stated under article 24 is 
manifested by the court’s power of issuing a warrant for the National 
Intelligence and Security Service to authorise the later to conduct surveillance 
against individual targets. Conversely, however, this power of the court 
becomes trivial by the fact that Art. 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation has 
blocked all the possibilities of probing the source and the methods used by the 
NISS while gathering the reported information. As a result, from the very 
beginning, the procedural issue of whether the Service was authorised by the 
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Court through a warrant to legitimize its act of surveillance would not be raised 
as an issue to the attention of the Court. To put it in other words, there is no 
any effect as to the validity of the information collected by the NISS even in 
cases where its actions were not backed by the blessing of the Court via the 
issuance of the required warrant. For that matter, the law has plainly stipulated 
that these intelligence information are admissible in the ordinary criminal court 
litigation with no need to disclose the source and the method implemented 
while procuring the evidence (See above, Section 4). 
On the part of the judiciary – let alone in the presence of such a legislative 
restriction on its inherent power of probing the commendable value of 
evidences submitted to it, plus, the politically sensitive nature of cases on 
terrorism – there seems to have inconsistency and lack of well-articulated 
judicial precedence in its interpretational jurisprudence on matters relating to 
evidence even on matters relating to ordinary crimes (Assefa, 2012). The 
judicial understanding of the doctrine of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt', as a 
standard of proof in the criminal litigations may be cited as a typical illustration 
of this aspect. One writer noticeably submits that:  
      “[...] plenty of court cases prove that Ethiopian courts and 
litigating parties ritually invoke proof beyond reasonable doubt. This does 
not mean, however, that they always employ this same standard, 
understand what it means and apply it in its proper sense” (Wodaje, 2010, 
P. 128).  
This floundering practice and unwarranted flexibility in the application of 
the standard of proof is visible not only in the judicial works of lower courts 
but also at the highest appellate courts. As insightfully observed by Zemichael 
(2014), nor is the practice of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench – the 
highest judicial organ legislatively empowered to render binding judgments on 
issues of law (Federal Courts Re-Amendment Proclamation, Proc. No. 
454/2005, Art.2(4)) –  far from such an inconsistent understanding of the 
principle. The Court’s slack standard in its application of the principle has been 
demonstratively visible in some of the cases it has rendered (Assefa, 2012). In 
light of this, the oversight role of the judiciary resembles to be more of a 
cosmetic than that of a profoundly adjusted and dependable monitoring 
mechanism with a capacity to cement accountability in the work of the NISS 
as an institution and its individual intelligence and security personnel. 
Coming to the legislative oversight, article 22 of the NISS Re-
Establishment Proclamation requires an appropriate 'Standing Committee' of 
the House of Peoples' Representatives to oversee the general activities of the 
Service. Out of the eighteen standing committees formed in the present 
Parliament (2015-2020), the Foreign Relations, Defence (Military) and 
Security affairs Standing Committee is in charge of this mandate (FDRE, 
House of Peoples’ Representatives Office of Spokesperson, 2017). This same 
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Committee also oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
National Defence, as well as, the Ethiopian Peace and Development 
International Institute (Ibid). More stunningly, a bird’s eye review of the listed 
responsibilities and powers of the Committee would reveal that almost all the 
monitoring activities that the Committee pledged to follow-up are more 
directed and concentrated to the works of the other organs other than the NISS 
(Ibid). Such an aversely asserted monitoring power is further decayed by the 
overtly restrained power of the Committee under the guise of National 
Security. As clearly cemented under article 22 (2) of the Proclamation, “The 
Committee's oversight under sub-article (1) of this-article may not be 
conducted in a manner that jeopardizes the national security of the country." 
This very general and imprecisely articulated restriction diminishes the watch-
dogging authority of the Committee and its genuine impact on ensuring the 
democratic accountability of the institution.  In this context, therefore, the 
Committee is overseeing the National Intelligence and Security Service not as 
a very sensitive organ which requires a watertight scrutiny rather as an ordinary 
federal government office that would the Committee visits once in a while (if 
at all).  
Furthermore, neither is the Parliament, as the highest politically 
authoritative body of the federal government capable of evaluating the general 
works of the NISS. While other ministerial offices are directly accountable to 
the Parliament at least through their duty of appearing before the House for 
questions and by submitting their quarterly, half, and annual performance and 
budget reports (FDRE Constitution, Art. 55(17)), the NISS on the other hand 
is not required to submit its report directly to the Parliament given that its 
accountability goes to the Prime Minister (NISS Re-Establishment 
Proclamation, Art. 12(2(g)). 
As a point of comparison, referring some experiences from other 
jurisdictions would be of help, lest to highlight the missing elements in the 
Ethiopian context and its impact in maintaining effective and accountable 
supervision mechanism of the works of the intelligence service (European 
Parliament, 2011; Australian Parliament 2017). In view of this, in Germany for 
example – aiming to retain the balance between the need to keep secrecy of the 
intelligence work on the one hand and the need to uphold a transparent and 
accountable operational system indispensable in a democratic society on the 
other – a citable model of parliamentary oversight is adopted in auditing the 
works of the intelligence services since 1978 and as later strengthened in 1999 
(Heyer, 2007). With due cognizance to some concerns about its efficiency 
(Wetzling, 2016, Wetzling 2017), a Parliamentary Control Panel which is 
accountable to the Bundestag (German Parliament) is in charge of this sensitive 
task.  
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The composition, its working procedures, and the substantial and effectual 
deepness of its mandate makes the Panel one of the most creditable intelligence 
monitoring and supervisory mechanisms. Firstly, the Panel is required to be 
composed of members that represent all competing political parties in the 
Parliament. Secondly, the Parliament has to set its working procedures, and 
each member of the Panel needs to have the trust of the majority of the 
Parliament. With such composition and vote of confidence granted to it by the 
Parliament, the Panel is mandated to scrutinize both the general matters of 
policy and finance but at the same time, the daily operational details and 
routine activities of the intelligence community (Act of 11 April 1978 (Federal 
Law Gazette I. p. 453), last amended by a law of 26 June 2001, Federal Law 
Gazette I. pp. 1254, 1260). For this task to be effective, the Federal 
Government is obliged to provide as complete as possible information (ENNR, 
2012). Even in some cases, if it is deemed necessary by the majority of the 
members of the Panel, it may appoint external and neutral experts to conduct 
inquiries into specific cases, the results of which could be used by the Panel in 
the course of exercising its watchdogging power (Heyer, 2007, p.72). Aside 
such overwhelming powers of the Parliamentary Control Panel, the 
intelligence and security works are also subject to supervision by other 
committees such as The Interior Committee, Defence Committee, ad hoc 
Committees of Inquiry, the G10 Commission, and the Bundestag itself. 
Moreover, courts in the form of judicial review have also general mandates to 
oversee the overall activities of the intelligence community (Wetzling, 2016). 
Albeit with a different model, the UK has also political supervision on the 
intelligence service through a sophisticated system of monitoring different 
intelligence operations. This said the principal power of oversight is vested in 
the quasi-parliamentary body called the Intelligence and Security Committee 
[ISC] (Morrison, 2007; ISC Annual Report, 2017). There are also other 
responsible bodies, such as the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner, and the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal; all exercising the power of controlling the proper functioning of the 
intelligence community (Ibid). Also, other states, inter alia, Canada (Collins, 
2002; Australian Parliament, 2017), South Africa, Norway, and Poland have 
standardised their controlling systems either through robust parliamentary or 
via non-parliamentary, independent and specialised over-sighting bodies 
(ENNR, 2012). 
Turning now to the Ethiopian context in contrast, what can be deduced 
from the current arrangement is nothing but the loosely (if not none) inculcated 
legislative oversight and an effectual exclusion of the judicial review; leaving 
the lion's share of this thin-skinned authority in the hands of the executive. 
This, coupled with the overall tendency of the waning role of the legislature, 
and the de-facto monopoly of the executive in a one-party system casts doubts 
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as to the legitimacy of this organ and its priorities – expounding mingled 
interests; public interest versus government interest; national interest versus 
party interest debates – in the domestic politico-legal quagmire.  
With this arrangement whereby the head of the executive is 
masterminding the operation of the intelligence and security service, there is 
no guarantee against the political abuse and illegitimate functioning of the 
National Intelligence and Security Service as an institution and the staffs in 
their individual capacity. This might trigger twofold shortcomings: on the one 
hand, the unwanted risk for executive manipulation and the tendencies for 
hijacking the natural functioning of the National Intelligence and Security 
Service cannot be ruled out which may expose the Service being instrumental 
in achieving some illegitimate and arbitrary ends orchestrated by the executive.  
On the other hand, the longer such a non-transparent and loosened 
supervisory structure of the intelligence and security landscape is maintained, 
the higher is the risk that NISS might eventually evolve as a rogue Elephant 
even without the knowledge and/or beyond the controlling power of the head 
of the executive itself, i.e. the Prime Minister. In view of this, the very recent 
bomb attack blast at the rally at Meskel Square in the capital Addis Ababa 
where tens of thousands gathered in support of the new Ethiopian Prime 
Minister could be cited as an example in substantiating such an inevitable 
concern (East African News, 2018). The attack was also reportedly aimed at 
targeting and assassinating the Prime Minister himself. No doubt that it's too 
early to conclude but as it stands, the then Head of the Anti-Terrorism Task 
Force of the National Intelligence Security Service and other top officials are 
currently on trial as suspected culprits charged with crimes of planning and 
orchestrating the explosion (ESAT, Ethiopia 2018). 
The grand question is, therefore, having in mind all the aforementioned 
legislative and practical pitfalls in monitoring the Service’s operation, how 
logical is it to rely on information gathered by this institution, at least in the 
absence of a methodical inspection mechanisms aimed at verifying the 
legitimacy of the methods and the procedures employed in procuring the 
evidence during the criminal litigation in the court of law? In highlighting the 
practical scenario with specific reference to the majority of terrorism cases, a 
group of Ethiopian Human Rights Activists reported that: 
 “[...] the search for terrorists and the investigation process have been 
similar and unchanged. First victims are arrested by national intelligent 
and security services, detained in one of the detention centres and beaten 
and tortured until they confessed their crime. Then, the federal police 
crime investigation centre or "Maekelawi" will start investigation while 
they are in custody. The investigation will proceed under this department 
in its anti-terror unit that deploys over twenty investigators. Lastly, all 
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needed evidence will be cooked by the anti-terror unit investigators using 
different mechanisms.” (Ethiopian Human Rights Project, 2014). 
What appears rather disquieting is, therefore, such a delicate and 
practically ineffective monitoring setup, which lacks the necessary normative, 
procedural and institutional capacity and integrity. As a result, there is no 
guarantee that this critical gap in maintaining NISS’s institutional 
accountability might gradually lead to a consequential risk of creating a 
landscape where the National Intelligence and Security operates as a rogue 
Elephant cementing itself beyond the reach of all the possible politico-legal 
and institutional controlling mechanisms of its activities.    
 
6. Conclusion  
To sum it up, looking at the role of the National Intelligence and Security 
Service in the prevention and countering of terrorism, the article submits that 
the two legislative frameworks – the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 
No 652/2009 and the National Intelligence and Security Service Re-
Establishment Proclamation No. 804.2013 – have cemented the Service as a 
‘lone-wolf’ institution portrayed as unique organ of its kind.  In so doing, two 
paradoxical and perplexing approaches seem to have affected its original 
institutional legitimacy and its functional integrity. On the one hand, the two 
proclamations have unwarrantedly merged a multitude of mandates and 
powers, and have entrusted this organ as a sole authority to lead and carry out 
all the functions. On the other hand, these same legislations are short of firmly 
stipulating the strict normative standards, and in creating a commendable 
politico-legal controlling platform that is capable of watchdogging and 
monitoring the daily functioning of the Service. Notwithstanding the delicately 
articulated indications for executive, judicial, and legislative oversight 
mechanisms, given the very demanding nature of scrutinizing its operation, 
and in comparison to the corresponding regulatory and institutional 
frameworks adopted in other jurisdictions, the Service appears to enjoy 
unfastened immunity. And hence, the key task of ensuring its accountability is 
largely compromised if not totally overlooked.   
The repercussion of such an untied approach can be asserted in twofold 
standpoints. Firstly, in the context of the general institutional standing of the 
NISS, the most essential task of balancing its autonomy with that of the 
required level of transparency and accountability is left without a proper 
regulatory threshold. As a result, there seems to have no surety of preventing 
the two undesirable outcomes: i.e. either the risk that the NISS becomes too 
feeble to the extent fully controlled by the regime in power, or to that of the 
opposite upshot with the danger of gradually emerging as a completely 
unrestrained and powerful organ postulating itself as a de facto government 
that runs on own pact.         
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The second impact relates to the specific threat that the work of the NISS 
would pose to the rights of individual suspects. The Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation has not only explicitly endorsed admissibility of evidence 
gathered by the intelligence but also has forfeited the fundamental procedural 
requirement of probing their validity. Accordingly, there is no guarantee for 
suspects’ indestructible freedom from torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
Such unauthenticated dependency on intelligence and security information has 
also in effect neglected the suspects’ right to a fair trial and the right to the 
presumption of innocence as painted both in the pertinent international human 
rights instruments and the FDRE Constitution as the supreme law of the land. 
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